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 Editorials | November 2006 
Truth was Buried with the Victims
 Sean Mattson - El Universal
| | Family members of trapped miners react in San Juan de Sabinas, Mexico after February's mine blast. (AP) |
Nearly nine months after one of the largest North American workplace disasters in recent memory, answers to what happened in the Pasta de Conchos coal mine seem as deeply buried as the 64 bodies still under the rubble.
The mine´s Feb. 19 explosion and collapse killed 65 workers, injured 11 and eventually called attention to infrequent inspections, flawed equipment, missing documents and allegations that its operators ignored months of obvious warning signs of an explosive mixture of dust and gas.
A special prosecutor for the state of Coahuila said recently that homicide charges could be filed against the mine operator, the federal government or the miners union as early as next month.
But it´s unclear whether any such charges will stick.
From the outset, those responsible for the mine and its safety made fire-and-brimstone speeches vowing that the negligent would be punished, while denying wrongdoing themselves.
The Labor Secretariat, responsible for enforcing mine safety laws, said it inspected the mine 12 days before the blast, finding it in perfect operational order.
Grupo Minera México, the mine operator, pointed to the inspection as proof of its impeccable safety record. But the inspection was only partial and the company could not produce dozens of required safety records, claiming information had been "lost" in the chaotic days after the blast.
The miners union scoffed and said it reported many safety concerns. Rank-and-file miners said they reported a litany of potentially lethal violations to union leaders who took no action.
What has come to light since then only makes things murkier.
In the wake of the blast, the Labor Secretariat had vowed to assemble foreign and national experts to carry out an independent probe. But it contacted only a fraction of the experts it named, then mysteriously suspended their work in June and won´t talk about the results.
Also refusing to comment on it are Behre Dolbear, a mining consulting firm that participated in the initial phase of the investigation, and the mining chamber of commerce, which coordinated it.
"I can almost guarantee ... they´re going to try to find that it was caused by something that the miners did," said Antony Strickland, a Canadian mining consultant who volunteered to participate in the independent investigation but was turned away.
"There is no valid reason why independent inspectors should not be present during recovery efforts," he said. "In fact, they probably should be there if a proper investigation is to take place."
Until rescuers clear the mine - a monumental task only about one-third complete - it may be impossible to know what sparked the disaster.
Similar accidents around the world suggest three things were probably awry at the time of the blast: The mine was not properly ventilated, highly volatile coal dust had not been neutralized and methane detection systems either failed or were ignored.
Jorge Ríos Coss, the state of Coahuila´s special prosecutor on the case, said all three factors are being examined in his criminal investigation.
Early in the investigation, union representatives and others said the mine operator claimed to have lost its daily safety records.
In a written June response to the Labor Secretariat, in which Grupo México handed over numerous documents that it could not produce for inspectors right after the blast, it claimed paperwork was missing.
"Unfortunately, due to the accident, ... our offices ... had a chaotic (operation) upon being used by many people from outside the company," the response said, referring to missing records of annual fire drills. "Much information ... has been lost."
State prosecutor Ríos said all necessary safety records have been obtained, but he was not put in charge of the case by the Coahuila government until around July, when concerns arose about the federal investigation.
Ríos said investigators are focused on proving that the mine was unsafely operated and that miners had told supervisors and union officials of their concerns.
"Part of the investigation has concentrated on if, in fact, (workers) made these reports and if (supervisors) were aware, why they did not take measures accordingly," he said.
After a series of fatal accidents in small Coahuila coal mines early this decade, the federal government established a special office to inspect these pocitos - small pits - but left inspections of larger mines to the Labor Secretariat.
Officials point to a decrease in accidents in these small mines, but larger operations like Pasta de Conchos, which was operating unsafely in 2002, according to documents, did not receive special attention from inspectors.
Since the explosion, the Labor Secretariat has been a poster child for opacity. It refuses to produce documents from the Feb. 7 inspection. But the National Commission on Human Rights (CNDH) examined inspection records and found public servants were "co- responsible for the sad events" of Feb. 19, said Susana Thalía Pedroza, a top CNDH investigator.
Documents showed that from 2002 to 2006, inspectors only visited the mine, on average, once a year and never demanded immediate correction of serious safety shortcomings. |
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